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 1 
Out with the Bases of Death: Civil Society and Peace Mobilisation in Greece during the 
1980s 
 
I. 
The peace campaign against the Euromissiles constituted one of the biggest mass 
movements in modern European history, with a strong transnational and Pan-European 
dimension.1 In their work, Lawrence S. Wittner and Benjamin Ziemann have provided both the  
interpretive backbone and the historical background necessary for the growing research in the 
field.2 The recent declassification of archival material pertaining to NATOs dual-track decision 
and the ensuing upsurge of peace mobilisation has gathered the attention of historians, with a 
particular focus on the Western European countries that were earmarked to deploy the 
Euromissiles.3 However, this is not yet the case for Southern Europe.4 This paper aims to 
examine the neglected peace movements in Greece during the early 1980s, and attempts to offer 
a social and political history of Cold War Greece from below. It aims to do so while exploring 
the multi-layered complexities of its interaction with parties, government, international 
developments and mobilisation. In particular, it will examine why protests occurred and how 
they contributed to political participation, as well as how they were connected to political parties 
                                                      
1 Benjamin Ziemann, A Quantum of Solace? European Peace Movements during the Cold War and their 
Elective Affinities, Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, 49 (2009), 351. 
2 Lawrence S. Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 
to the Present (Stanford 2003); Benjamin Ziemann (ed.), Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the USA 
Since 1945 (Essen 2007). 
3 The most recent examples include: Green Politics in Germany, special issue of German Politics & Society, 33, 4 
(2015); Rasmus Mariager, Surveillance of Peace Movements in Denmark during the Cold War, Journal of 
Intelligence History, 12, 1 (2013), 6075; Holger Nehring and Benjamin Ziemann, Do All Paths Lead to 
Moscow? The NATO Dual-Track Decision and the Peace Movement  A Critique, Cold War History, 12, 
1 (2012), 124; Kristina Spohr Readman, Conflict and Cooperation in Intra-Alliance Nuclear Politics: 
Western Europe, the United States, and the Genesis of NATOs Dual-Track Decision, 19771979, 
Journal of Cold War Studies, 13, 2 (2011), 4143. 
4 Leopoldo Nutis research is an exception, but his work still emphasises government policy. See, for 
example, Leopoldo Nuti, Me Too, Please: Italy and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons, 19451975, 
Diplomacy & Statecraft, 4, 1 (1993), 11448. See also an exhibition catalogue by Eirini Karamouzi and 
Christos Christidis, Fighting for Peace: Greece-Italy-Spain in the 1980s (Athens 2018). 
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and influenced by domestic developments and wider historical events. The paper also questions 
the ways in which these protests were entangled with other European peace movements and 
how they managed to encompass various segments of Greek society.5  
While the transnational nature of Greek activism forms an important part of the 
countrys story, following its cultural and historical idiosyncrasies will deepen our understanding 
of what popularised the peace message within wider society. The initial impetus for mobilisation 
was anti-nuclear fear, but peace as a concept continuously evolved  it consisted of 
communicative and symbolic debates and contestations about the shape and form of the 
political and social order.6 Indeed, the use of conceptual frameworks for the analysis of new 
social movements will shed light on the master frames that emerged in the Greek peace 
discourse of the 1980s, which brought together people from diverse political and social 
backgrounds.7 In his ground-breaking work on framing processes, David Snow states that the 
fear of nuclear holocaust is not immediately felt by the population and it had to be made 
visible by the media and  defined, interpreted, and framed by politicians, scientists, and 
social movements.8 In this context, the concept of framing is based on the constructive 
principle that shared meanings arise through interpretive procedures and are mediated by several 
contextual factors. 
For a frame to be effective, it has to be empirically credible  in other words, 
consonant with what the audiences know to be true.9 In Greece, peace protesters fortified their 
                                                      
5 Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction (2nd edn, Blackwell 2006). In this 
article, peace movement refers to the protest against nuclear armaments and not nuclear energy, which is 
a substantial but different area of research. For more information, see Andrew S Tompkins, Better Active 
than Radioactive! Anti-Nuclear Protest in 1970s France and West Germany (Oxford 2016). 
6 Holger Nehring and Helge Pharo, Introduction: A Peaceful Europe? Negotiating Peace in the 
Twentieth Century, Contemporary European History, 17, 3 (2008), 278. 
7 Hanspeter Kriesi et al. (eds), New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis (London and 
New York 1995). 
8 David Snow, Framing Processes, Ideology and Discursive Fields, in Snow David, Soule, Sarah & 
Kriesi, Hanspieter (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (Oxford 2007), 380-412. 
9 Francesca Polletta, Storytelling in Social Movements, in Hank Johnston (ed.), Culture, Social Movements, 
and Protest (Aldershot 2012), 34. 
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message by drawing on the experience of the recent dictatorship, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, 
American involvement in the form of NATO bases on Greek soil, as well as a craving for dignity 
that permeated the narrative of the transition to democracy after 1974. The victory of the 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and its leader Andreas Papandreou in the October 
1981 national elections further shaped this peace narrative. A version of reality rooted in tense 
emotional terms, it required foreign scapegoats and reinforced the countrys burning quest for 
true sovereignty. As well as focusing on this dominant discourse and the ways in which anti-
nuclear protest was framed, this paper examines the political conditions under which this 
discourse became accepted, thus subscribing to the concepts of frame alignment and political 
opportunity.  
Paradoxically, the biggest threat to security that captured the Greek imagination was a 
NATO ally, Turkey, and not a country across the Iron Curtain. The fall of the Greek 
dictatorship in 1974 had been inexorably linked to the military juntas failed coup détat against 
Makarios and the consequent Turkish invasion of Cyprus in that same year. Moreover, there was 
a unique political situation in Greece as the socialist government embraced the peace movements 
and Papandreou, its leader, progressively became the movements public icon. As Saskia Richter 
notes, the peace movement usually took a sceptical view of political leaders. Notwithstanding its 
grassroots-inspired structures of decision-making, there were key players who succeeded in 
developing particularly high profiles with regard to certain issues.10 Papandreou proved to be 
such a protagonist, reaching celebrity status within both the Greek and international peace 
movement. He also aided in shaping the national discourse on a version of peace that resonated 
with the Greek people.11 
                                                      
10 Saskia Richter, The Protagonists of the Peace Movement, in Becker-Schaum, Christoph et al. (eds), 
The Nuclear Crisis:. The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s (New York 
and Oxford 2016), 189. 
11 Eirini Karamouzi and Dionysios Chourchoulis, Troublemaker or Peacemaker? Andreas Papandreou, 
the Euromissile Crisis, and the Policy of Peace, 198186, Cold War History, 19, 1 (2019), 2961. 
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This paper will trace the peace movements morphology and framing through a careful 
reading of a selection of five national newspapers  both centre-left and left-wing  and their 
coverage of the protests.12 The focus will be on peaceful forms of protesting such as rallies, 
demonstrations and sit-ins, rather than confrontational or violent acts.13 The press remained an 
important source of information in the 1980s, and their value is highlighted by the fact that 74% 
of men and 51% of women in Greece used newspapers as their main source of information. The 
wider European average was 59% and 46%, respectively.14 As well as their usefulness in 
illustrating the extent of peaceful protest, these newspapers provide an interesting insight into 
which images and slogans were selected and distributed within the press. 
This data will be juxtaposed with the outputs (campaign leaflets, journals, posters, 
photographs and memoirs) produced by activists. The visual and textual content that is available 
in both sources provides an invaluable tool in understanding not only the politics and culture of 
peace mobilisation, but also the definition that Greeks attributed to peace.15 This will be the first 
time that the three organised peace movements will be examined in depth following the ebbs 
and flows of their activity and the interaction with domestic parties and the international arena 
during the intense years of mobilisation from 1979 to 1986.16 Semi-structured interviews with the 
main protagonists and an analysis of Pan-European platforms such as European Nuclear 
Disarmament (END) will reveal the inner workings and transnational links of these 
                                                      
12 Ta Nea, To Vima, and Ethnos are all centre-left, pro-government newspapers; Rizospastis (the official 
newspaper for the KKE) and Avgi (pro-KKE Esoterikou). The identification of protests and their 
volume is aided by the European Protest and Coercion Data project at the University of Kansas, which is 
available via: <http://web.ku.edu/~ronfrand/data/>, accessed 13 February 2020. 
13 George Kassimeris, Greece: The Persistence of Political Terrorism, International Affairs, 89, 1 (2013), 
13142. 
14 Stephanos Pesmazoglou, The 1980s in the Looking Glass: PASOK and the Media, in Clogg, Richard 
(ed.), Greece, 19811989: The Populist Decade (New York 1993), 94112. 
15 Benjamin Ziemann, The Code of Protest: Images of Peace in West German Peace Movements, 1945
1990, Contemporary European History, 17, 2 (2008), 23761; Adrian Bingham, The Digitization of 
Newspaper Archives: Opportunities and Challenges for Historians, Twentieth Century British History, 21, 2 
(2010), 22531. 
16 The Contemporary Social History Archives (ASKI) holds a collection on AKE. The Andreas 
Papandreou Foundation (APF) holds one on KEADEA. EEDYE is still in operation, but it now only 
provides access to its journal: ƅƱƼƬƯƩ ƴƧƲ ƆƩƱƞƭƧƲ [Roads to Peace]. 
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organisations, respectively.17 Finally, public opinion polls will be consulted at times (and with 
caution) to showcase collective emotions and sentiments within Greek society. As Michael Geyer 
puts it, these polls reveal, as if in a supermarket surveillance video, elements of politics of 
everyday affect.18  
 
II. 
Since the early post-war years, Greece has had a history of involvement in international 
peace mobilisation. In May 1955, the Greek Committee for International Détente and Peace 
(EEDYE) was created as the first organised peace movement. It was friendly towards the Soviet 
Union and was quickly incorporated under the aegis of the communist-led World Peace Council 
(WPC).19 Notwithstanding its benevolent attitude towards communism and the Soviet Union, 
EEDYE had made a conscious effort to create a politically non-aligned movement with 
transnational and international links. In the 1960s, high points of its activity included its 
marathon marches, where activists demanded the withdrawal from NATO, the abolition of 
American bases, a nuclear-free Balkan region and nuclear disarmament. These marches were 
                                                      
17 The collections on CND and END are held at the London School of Economics (LSE) Library; The 
interviewer conducted semi-structured interviews by following a pre-defined series of questions, which 
were finalized after thorough reading of the secondary literature, archival material and media content. The 
aim was to firstly grasp the perceptions of salient elite figures and secondly interviewees were treated as 
informants in order to fill in the gaps related to the research puzzle. For more on methodology, please 
see: Lewis Anthony Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing (Washington 2006) 
18 The European Commissions Eurobarometer survey provides information on attitudes towards the 
USA and the Soviet Union. For more information on these polls, see Michael Geyer, Cold War Angst: 
The Case of West-German Opposition to Rearmament and Nuclear Weapons, in Hanna Schissler (ed.), 
The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 19491968 (New Jersey 2001), 378. 
19 For more information on the genesis of the Greek peace movement, see Evi Gkotzaridis, Who Will 
Help Me to Get Rid of this Man?: Grigoris Lambrakis and the Non-Aligned Peace Movement in Post-
Civil War Greece: 19511964, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 30, 2 (2012), 299338. On the Soviet role in 
the WPC, see Gerhard Wettig, The Last Soviet Offensive in the Cold War: Emergence and Development 
of the Campaign Against NATO Euromissiles, 19791983, Cold War History, 9, 1 (2009), 79110. 
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organised in honour of the first marathon peace-marcher and EEDYE Vice President, Grigorios 
Lambrakis; an anti-war activist who was assassinated on 22 May 1963.20  
During the years of military rule between 1967 and 1974, EEDYE had been prosecuted 
and all of its activities banned. Following the fall of the junta, however, the movement went back 
into operation. Its first President, General G Iordanidis, a Centre Union MP, was chosen on 16 
May 1975. Officially, EEDYE was defined as a movement of the widest expression of public 
opinion, independent of party affiliation, with the participation of mass organisations and public 
figures representing almost the entire spectrum of the countrys political and social forces. 
Indeed, it is true that in the first post-junta years, EEDYE did attract personalities from a wide 
political spectrum, despite its close ties with the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). Many of 
the most distinguished people in art, science and culture partook in the events organised by the 
committee.21 On a national scale, it established more than 150 local peace committees across the 
country. Furthermore, it published its own journal, Roads of Peace- first released in 1958 -which 
averaged a circulation of around 20,000 copies in 1984. Its central organs comprised a 21-
member secretariat which met every fortnight, a 100-member presidium which convened every 
six months and an annual 300-member National Council. The National Congress was the 
supreme organ of the EEDYE, and it took place every three years. 
In 1981, after 26 years of  EEDYE as the sole, united expression of the organised peace 
movement in Greece, two other peace committees were created: the Movement for Peace, 
Human Rights and National Independence (KEADEA) and the Non-Aligned Movement of 
Peace (AKE). Their creation was part and parcel of the emergence of a mass-mobilisation 
                                                      
20 Evi Gkotzaridis, Who Really Rules this Country? Collusion Between State and Deep State in Post-
Civil War Greece and the Murder of Independent MP Grigorios Lambrakis, 19581963, Diplomacy & 
Statecraft, 28, 4 (2017), 64673. 
21 For more information, see EEDYE leaflet, 31 Years of Struggle, 1986, LSE Library, END/20/6. 
Yiannis Ritsos, Dionysis Savvopoulos, Vaso Katraki and Yannis Gaitis were amongst the artists taking 
part in peace events. 
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phenomenon that characterised the countrys transition to democracy.22 KEADEA emerged as a 
result of some EEDYE members, with Christos Markopoulos  an individual with close ties to 
PASOK  at their helm, making the decision to leave EEDYE and form a new pacifist 
movement. According to a KEADEA member that would go on to become a foreign minister in 
the Papandreou government, this new peace initiative was an attempt to create a pacifist 
movement, free from control of the Communist Party.23 In his memoirs, Markopoulos, the 
future President of KEADEA, recounted that the people on the street only use red flags with 
slogans that are nothing but peaceful. He further emphasised their aggressive and revolutionary 
attitudes.24 In the 1950s and 1960s, KEADEA organisers had felt that mobilisation was 
justifiably Soviet-friendly. However, in the climate of the 1980s, such an affiliation discouraged 
many people who simply wanted to mobilise against nuclear proliferation and ignored societal 
demands for the peace effort to be aimed at both superpowers.  
A similar rationale was used in the creation of a third organised peace movement in May 
1981. AKE sprang from an initiative of old members of the Lambrakis Democratic Youth and 
EEDYE, all of whom were disillusioned with the pro-Soviet line of the latter. AKE was closely 
linked to the Communist Party of Greece Interior (KKE Esoterikou), a Eurocommunist party 
that emerged after a split in the KKE in the late 1960s.25 Both KEADEA and AKE called for 
political pluralism. Its implementation was disputed, however, in terms of both party 
organisation and protest mobilisation. 
 The intense competition amongst left-wing parties was echoed in the divergence of their 
goals and in their varied concerns on how different organised peace movements would 
overcome their differences as they developed along party lines. Panos Trigazis, a senior member 
                                                      
22 Giannis Voulgaris, ƈ ƍƥƴơưƯƫƩƴƥƵƴƩƪƞ ƆƫƫƜƤơ, 19742009 [Greece in Metapolitefsi, 19742009] (Athens 
2016). 
23 Theodoros Pagkalos, ƍƥ ƴƯƭ ƂƭƤƱƝơ ƳƴƧƭ ƆƵƱƾưƧ [With Andreas in Europe] (Athens 2011), 24. 
24 Christos Markopoulos, With Andreas Papandreou and the World Peace Movement [in Greek] (Athens 2005). 
25 Eurocommunism called for independence from Soviet Communism and a promotion of a reformist, 
moderate, pro-European with elements of political liberal agenda. See more in Ioannis Balampanidis, 
Eurocommunism. From the Communist to the Radical European Left (London and New York 2018). 
 8 
of EEDYE, admits that there was intense politicisation of the Greek peace movement in 
contrast to other ones in Western Europe that maintained its grassroots and non-aligned 
character.26 All three organised movements were closely associated with parliamentary parties, 
receiving financing and guidelines on issues of mobilisation. Instead of moderation and unity, 
however, these parties opted for intense polarisation. After the fall of the dictatorship,  party 
patronage and polarised political culture pervaded mass movements in Greece in the 1980s.27 As 
Kalyvas notes, parties literally colonised civil society by assuming control of professional, local, 
cultural and even high school students association.28 Even AKE  which aimed to distinguish 
itself from its ideological opponent, EEDYE, and refrain from any rigid manipulation of protest 
on the ground  allowed its affiliated party, KKE Esoterikou, to coordinate its actions. In 
contrast to the Greek feminist movement that saw the formation of several autonomous group, 
peace mobilisation struggled to escape party patronage.29 In one of AKEs publications, the 
relationship between the party and protest movements was compared to the dependent and oft-
problematic relationship between father and son.30  
Whereas in parts of Western Europe some forms of protest were largely autonomous, in 
Greece, rigidly structured left-wing organisation did not wither away for most social movements 
in the 1980s.31 In her study on Greek social movements, Simiti showcases how the salience of 
                                                      
26 Interview with Panos Trigazis, 8 February 2018. 
27 Dimitri Sotiropoulos and Evika Karamagioli, Greek Civil Society: The Long Road to Maturity, CIVICUS  
Civil Society Index Shortened Assessment Tool, Report for the Case of Greece (Athens 2006). 
<http://europe.cidem.org/documents/CSI-SAT_Greece_Report.pdf>, accessed 14 February 2020; 
Takis Pappas & Zina Assimakopopuloou, Party Patronage in Greece: Political Entrepreneurship in a 
Party Patronage Democracy, in Kopecky, Petr et al (eds.), Party Patronage and Party Government in European 
Parties (Oxford 2012), 144-162. 
28 Stathis N. Kalyvas, Polarization in Greek Politics: PASOKs First Four Years, 19811985, Journal of the 
Hellenic Diaspora, 23, 1 (1997), 90. 
29 Konstantina Vaiou (ed.), ƆƭƭƯƩƯƫƯƣƞƳƥƩƲƪơƩƑƱơƪƴƩƪƝƲƴƯƵƖƥƬƩƭƩƳƬƯƽƍƥƴơưƯƫƟƴƥƵƳƧ ƪơƩ «ƍƥƴƜ» [Meanings 
and Practices of Feminism. Metapolitefsi and After] (Athens 2018). 
30 Declaration by AKE Thessaloniki, November 1984, ASKI. 
31 Nikolaos Papadogiannis, Red and Purple? Feminism and Young Greek Eurocommunists in the 1970s, 
European Review of History: Revue européenne dhistoire, 22, 1 (2015), 17. The exception in Greeces peace 
mobilisation was the extremely small group advocating for conscientious objectors that formed around 
Michalis Tremopoulos and Michalis Maragkakis. Interview with M. Tremopoulos, 04 April 2018. 
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the left-right cleavage undermined the development of an autonomous social movement.32  For 
example, KEADEA  with the support of PASOK, as Yannis Voulgaris, Professor of Politics 
and prominent intellectual of KKE esoterikou confesses  emulated the communist partys rigid 
and all-controlling process for the organisation of mobilisation.33 In a letter to Papandreou, the 
leaders of KEADEA underlined the importance of PASOKs organisational edifice in mobilising 
the people to get on the streets.34 Albeit with some exceptions, the party was at the epicentre of 
the peace protests. This discouraged many people from joining a peace protests as they 
questioned the reasons for joining when it just serves party purposes.35 As a leading figure of 
AKE confesses, there was barely any spontaneous mobilisation since all three parties were 
investing resources and energy in mobilising their voters and respective constituencies.36 During 
EEDYEs ninth Panhellenic conference in 1984, party infiltration became the main topic of 
concern: It is inconceivable that we are wasting time trying to overcome party differences. The 
peace movement by its nature should be unified otherwise it will lose its appeal to the masses.37 
The lack of autonomy in the mobilisation for peace was also party attributed to the deafening 
silence of the Church. With the exception of some archbishops in Crete who were quite active in 
mobilising in areas near American bases, the official stance of the Orthodox church was rather 
non-committal as peace initiatives were still stigmatised in ecclesiastic circles as communist 
inspired.38 Unlike the Catholic church, the nationalisation of the Greek Orthodox Church, with 
its secured funding from the state, hindered civic engagement.39  
                                                      
32 Marilena Simiti, Social Movements, in Featherstone, Kevin & Sotiropoulos, Dimitris (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Modern Greek Politics (Oxford 2020) 
33 Interview with Yannis Voulgaris, 13 December 2017. 
34 Letter by T. Markopoulos, April 1983, AFP, Box 10. 
35 Declaration by AKE Thessaloniki, November 1984, ASKI. 
36 Interview with X activist, 22 February 2018. 
37 Report on the 9th Panhellenic EEDYE conference, 24 November 1984, ASKI. 
38 Interview with Panos Trigazis, 8 February 2018. 
39 Constantine P. Danopoulos, Religion, Civil Society, and Democracy in Orthodox Greece, Journal of 
Southern Europe and the Balkans, 6, 1 (2004), 48. 
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At the same time, the Greek situation echoed a general phenomenon of the wider peace 
movement against Euromissiles, where unlike 1968 that challenged the ruling political and social 
order and shocked the establishment, this specific wave of protests extended to the 
establishment  From communists to social democrats, many left-leaning citizens in the 1970s 
and 1980s acted according to double loyalties. Consciously they saw themselves as members of 
the traditional organization and of a new social movement at the same time.40 This lack of 
distinction between the establishment and civilian protest partially explains the volume and 
intensity of the peace movement in Greece. The popularity of peace was such that even the 
centre-right party, New Democracy (ND), encouraged the creation of an affiliated peace 
committee: the Movement for Multilateral Disarmament, Freedom and Security (KIPAEA), with 
Andreas Andrianopoulos, a former minister in the ND government, as its President. This 
movement was, however, based on a completely different concept of security than the others, in 
that it accepted nuclear weapons as a deterrent.41  
Despite the partitocracy of the movements and a vivid nationalistic agenda,42 the Greek 
mobilisation for peace was driven by the widely shared goals of preventing all-out nuclear war 
and achieving nuclear disarmament. This anti-nuclear sentiment was highlighted in an 
international opinion poll in 1983 and 1984, which asked participants to respond to the idea that 
the use of nuclear weapons is not acceptable under any circumstances, not even if we are 
attacked with nuclear weapons. Greece returned one of the highest approval rates with 51%, 
third after Spain and Japan.43 As in the rest of Europe, the possible introduction of the neutron 
bomb and the 1979 dual-track decision precipitated a new wave of campaigning in the face of a 
                                                      
40 Jan Hansen, Christian Helm and Frank Reichherzer (eds), Making Sense of the Americas: How Protest 
Related to America in the 1980s and Beyond (Frankfurt 2015), 17. 
41 Interview with Andreas Andrianopoulos, 6 March 2018. 
42 Asteris Huliaras, The Dynamics of Civil Society in Greece: Creating Civic Engagement from the Top, 
The Jean Monnet Papers on Political Economy, 10/2014. 
43 Connie de Boer, The Polls: The European Peace Movement and Deployment of Nuclear Missiles, 
Public Opinion Quarterly, 49, 1 (1985), 125. 
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fragile détente and the possibility of limited nuclear war.44 These developments were cited as 
motivation by the leaders of all three Greek pacifist movements, albeit for different reasons. For 
example, the KKE-led EEDYE  despite its declaration of non-partisanship  blamed the US 
for rendering Europe its outpost and creating an imaginative danger through its opposition to 
the SS-20 missile. Ultimately, as an EEDYE member claimed, the USA and NATO escalated 
the tension while the Soviet Union has consistently evoked the spirit of détente in both words 
and deeds.45 The presidents of KEADEA and AKE on the other hand, while sharing the 
concerns about US actions, thought that the genuine reason behind mobilisation was a desire to 
fight against nuclear armaments, notwithstanding their origins, and freeze further deployment. In 
demonstrations, people shouted: not another cent for missiles, not another Kopek for 
missiles.46  
In contrast to Belgium, Italy, West Germany, Britain and the Netherlands, however, 
Greece did not face the prospect of Euromissile deployment. Therefore, its peace movement 
quickly redirected its struggles to the pressing needs of the country. ƂONLV$UJ\ULDGLV(('<(·V
President in 1983, explained that in order for the peace movement to be the great movement of 
our times, a movement of the whole people  it must be linked with the peoples daily 
problems and struggles. 47 Given the demands for Greeces withdrawal from NATO and for the 
removal of foreign military bases, the fight against the imperialist schemes of the superpowers 
and calls for national sovereignty dominated the Greek peace agenda. 
 
III.   
                                                      
44 April Carter, Peace Movements: International Protest and World Politics Since 1945 (London and New York 
1992), 109; Nuti, Leopoldo et al. (eds), The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War (Washington 2015); 
Lawrence Freedman, Note of the Month: The Neutron Bomb Returns, World Today, 37, 3 (1981), 8187. 
45 Report on the 9th Panhellenic EEDYE conference, 24 November 1984, ASKI. 
46 Ta Nea, 2 December 1981. 
47 Address by the President of EEDYE, Alkis Argyriadis, at the Extraordinary National Conference of 
EEDYE, 34 June 1983, LSE Library, END/20/6. 
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In Greece, the upsurge of protest activity found support from major trade unions, 
professional associations and thousands of everyday people. It is important to understand the 
political background for the rising popularity and the messaging of the pacifist movement. The 
resurgence of peace mobilisation coincided with the changing political context that brought 
PASOK, a socialist party, to power for the first time in the post-war period. The socialists 
election victory in 1981 represented a radical break with the past, pointing to a transformative 
period in domestic and foreign policy.48 PASOK secured its overwhelming majority with a 
nationalist agenda, declaring Greece a victim of NATO and the EEC  the alleged embodiments 
of the Western imperialist design. Once in government, Papandreou broke his electoral promises 
and mostly followed a pragmatic pro-Western foreign policy. Unsurprisingly, this reversal was 
not reflected in his rhetoric and public declarations. From the beginning, he set the tone for a 
polarised political climate which allowed the peace movement to flourish. He welcomed the 
creation of the affiliated peace movement, KEADEA, in the summer of 1981, stating that for 
the Greek people, the issue of peace acquires special meaning. We are hosting the American 
military bases as well as nuclear weapons, with the acquiescence of the Right. At the same time, 
we are facing Attila in Cyprus and the expansionary policies of Turkey in the Aegean.49 Thus, 
from early on in his first term, Papandreou interpreted peace along nationalist lines, including an 
attack on the political right, a strong anti-American sentiment and by pointing to Turkey as the 
major enemy. He had made it repeatedly clear that he viewed Ankara as the main foe:  
 
We really have a unique problem in Greece, which really you do not meet in any other 
country member of the alliance. We sense a threat from an ally on our east, Turkey. One 
of the major problems in Greek defence over the last seven years has been the 
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preparation of defence in case Turkey, beyond words, decided to actually make good on 
its claims.50  
 
It is only against this background that Papandreou was able to get away with excessive 
defence spending (around 7% of GDP), a policy that rested on a broad consensus across 
political parties.51 This spending was framed as a way to protect peace  in other words, to 
provide security against the perceived threat posed by Turkey. The Turkish threat gave rise to a 
'leftish expression of nationalism in the context of an anti-imperialist rhetoric.52  This was 
accompanied by a deep-seated anti-Americanism that drove peace movements in the period in 
Greece and across wider Europe, facilitating the broad coalition of activists from diverse 
backgrounds.53 Activists rallied against the US and its decision to install Pershing II and Cruise 
missiles in Europe  a move they interpreted as a desperate effort to rally support around a non-
existing threat. All three Greek peace movement organisations  KEDEA, EEDYE and AKE  
accused the US of jeopardising peace and of cancelling the spirit of détente with one stroke.  
In Greece, diverse cultural, political and ideological factors determined the nature of anti-
Americanism during the post-war years. After 1974, political discourse centred on Cyprus, the 
Turkish threat, demands for national sovereignty, the fight for national dignity and anti-right 
rhetoric.54 According to Dinas, a cleavage in Greek political culture soon developed. In this, the 
right was projected as representing the post-civil war system; one which lacked legitimacy and 
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was associated with American infiltration.55 Quickly, anti-Americanist sentiment became a 
unifying factor that superseded the Cold War consensus of the pre-junta years and no longer 
presupposed causal events but constituted a popular interpretive framework for the construction 
of meaning.56 This sentiment soon became institutionalised, and was further exacerbated by 
Ronald Reagans ascendancy to the US presidency in 1981. In addition, most Greeks believed 
that Americans had facilitated the imposition of the Greek dictatorship and had remained silent 
during the Turkish invasion.57 It is no surprise, therefore, that the Eurobarometer polls reveal 
that anti-American attitudes in Greece were consistently higher than the EU average. In 1982, 
80.6% of Greek participants expressed unfavourable feelings towards the US, whereas the EU 
average was 45.21%. At its peak, this difference reached approximately 40% in the early 1980s. It 
is clear, therefore, that Athens consistently held the most pronounced negative stance vis-à-vis 
the US.58  
  As part of this anti-Americanism, the main preoccupation in the Greek political 
imaginary was the perceived threat posed by the foreign bases stationed in the country. These 
bases did not just serve a military function  instead, they had wider political, economic and 
cultural ramifications. Military bases are generally embattled garrisons: strategically important 
but politically vulnerable.59 This political vulnerability is easily heightened when host 
governments undergo a democratic transition, as Greece was experiencing at the time. Since 
1953, the country had been hosting four American bases: the Souda Bay naval base on Crete that 
could anchor the whole Sixth Fleet, the Hellenikon air base, and the Nea Makri and Heraklion 
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communication installation bases.60 During the intense mobilisation of peace movements in 
Greece, the government was negotiating the renewal of the 1977 agreement covering US military 
activities and bases in Greece as well as US military assistance to Greece. Almost all rallies during 
that period were running on a platform which called for sole national choice and the removal 
of foreign bases. An information bulletin distributed in 1982 by EEDYE warned that any 
negotiation could not and should not deal with any subject other than the speediest possible 
withdrawal of these bases. Any other solutions could mean nothing other than ceding our basic 
national sovereign rights, limiting our national independence and posing danger for the 
democratic course of our country.61 
The protesters mocked the so-called fraudulent guarantee of borders promised through 
NATO membership, as it is offered by those responsible for the imposition of the 7 year 
dictatorship in Greece, for the invasion and the maintenance of Turkish occupation in Cyprus 
and the incitement of the chauvinist adventurist claims of Turkey in the Aegean.62 KEADEAs 
President, Christos Markopoulos, a nuclear scientist and later a PASOK MEP, emphasised that 
the presence of foreign military bases was incompatible with national independence and posed a 
threat to peace in the country. Peace activists tapped into and perpetuated the Greek discourse 
of victimisation, with the US as the main culprit. In August 1982, Papandreou referred to the 
colonial character of the bases, echoing statements by EEDYE and KEADEA that had 
interpreted the country as the 53rd star in the American flag.63  
Greece was framed by the protesters as a victim of US imperialist design. Many of the 
banners displayed in demonstrations compared the fate of the Greeks to the struggles of the 
people of Salvador and Lebanon. In June 1982, in the wake of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, 
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tens of thousands of protesters of all ages marched outside the US Embassy, shouting slogans 
such as throw the Zionists out of London and no to the genocide of the Palestinians. These 
conflicts sparked a protest language in Greece that was not only pro-Arab but brought forward a 
transnational narrative of victimhood with America and Israel as the culprits. It was this 
correlation between victimhood and antisemitism that manifested at times within the peace 
movement, not religious in character but as a grievance against what was considered attempts for 
domination.64 The marches were organised by EEDYE and the Local Union of Towns and 
Municipalities of Attica. On the initiative of the Greek peace movement and under the aegis of 
the Ministry of Culture, with the participation of many known artists, a concert of solidarity to 
Lebanon was held at the Panathenaic stadium, with more than 80,000 people in attendance.65 At 
the concert, there was a forceful use of anti-imperialist terminology. Earlier that year in April, 
outrage was caused by the appearance of the US Sixth Fleet and the conduct of some of its 
soldiers on the island of Skiathos and in Piraeus. Likening them to pirates, protesters felt that the 
American presence insulted their national pride and dignity. The soldiers actions ignited public 
indignation (Piraeus is a port of peace: out with the Sixth Fleet). When they disembarked on 
Greek soil, they were described as boys chewing gum and smoking marijuana, regulars in an 
infamous bar, fornicating, drinking and committing adultery with prostitutes while destroying 
Greek property.66 
In February 1983, all three peace movements cooperated with the Association of 
Workers in Greece (GSEE) and the Lawyers Association to organise a Panhellenic protest 
against what they perceived as pressure from the Americans. With banners reading no to 
blackmails, national independence and out with the bases of death, the activists called on all 
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Greek people, regardless of party affiliation, to join in their fight against the foreign bases and to 
resist American provocation of the proud and democratic Greek nation.67 The protest was 
primarily organised in response to a decision made by the US Congress to increase military aid to 
Turkey disproportionally to Greece. Several weeks later, on 3 March 1983, Athens experienced 
one of the largest mass demonstrations with the support of all three organised peace 
movements. With the exception of the ND, all political parties also showed support. All the 
banners, flags and posters were in white and blue to reflect the unified voice of the activists and 
the tens of thousands of people that had packed the Constitution Square in front of the 
parliament building in Athens. It was one of the few moments that attracted people beyond the 
parties.68 According to Panos Trigazis, there was intense prior consultation amongst the three 
peace movements on the slogans utilised in the demonstration and a huge disagreement over the 
mention of the SS-20s. So, the compromise was no new missiles in Europe.69  
Joining the activists were 200,000 people from diverse bodies and associations, 
municipalities, popular artists and the Committee of Intellectuals and Artists for Peace. Even 
from the elevated steps leading to the parliament building, it was impossible to see where the 
demonstration ended. From 7 pm, the crowd began to swell. By 10 pm, many were still 
streaming into the Square. All the main streets were full of people who were protesting against 
the foreign bases and the American policy in the sensitive region of the Mediterranean. The first 
of three speeches, by EEDYE and its leader, Alkis Argyriadis, denounced the American bases as 
a huge mistake:  
 
In 1953 with the USGreek agreement we gave the Americans the right to come in, 
move around our country, do whatever they want without asking anyone. We reached a 
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point where in every ministry there would be an American consultant. The bases form a 
kind of dictatorship, a heavy web that is spreading throughout the country that is keeping 
Greece hostage.70  
 
For protesters, the bases had been a persistent source of national distress, with 
interventions having had a huge impact on political and social life. As stated in a joint declaration 
by EEDYE, KEADEA and AKE in 1983, in which Greeks were called on to take part in peace 
rallies, the role of the foreign bases is not to serve our national defence and security. It is to 
serve American military ambitions which are in opposition to our national interests, to Greek 
foreign policy and to our relations with the neighbouring countries of the Balkans and the 
Mediterranean.71 
The main sentiment expressed by the crowd was a determination to end the operation of 
the bases. The demand for their removal was meant to ensure that Greece would not get 
involved  either by mistake or by design  in any confrontation between the two superpowers. 
Some protesters carried homemade banners that read national independence, peace, foreign 
bases out, we love life, that is why we fight for peace and people remember: Greece, 1967, 
Cyprus, 1974, Turkey, 1980. The demonstrations were not isolated events confined to the 
capital. On the contrary, the whole country was experiencing high levels of mobilisation: around 
25,000 Cretans demonstrated against the bases in Heraklion, while in Thessaloniki more than 
50,000 assembled in the main square. Several days later, activists protested against the base at 
Nea Makri and formed a human chain, laying on the floor to depict the image of a thousand 
dead bodies as victims of nuclear war. During the protest, Nikos Kaisaris, a member of AKE, 
shouted: This is not a base. It is a huge electronic ear, that eavesdrops on the Balkans and the 
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Mediterranean. It played an incremental role in the invasion of Cyprus. Kaisaris statement 
drummed up support for Greeces national struggle and framed peace in nationalistic terms.72 
Even when PASOK finally signed a five-year agreement with the US on defence and 
economic cooperation in September 1983  which continued the operation of the four existing 
American bases and included a payment of $500 million in US military aid to Greece   
Papandreou declared that the struggle has been justified.73 The renewed accord was presented 
as an agreement for eventual withdrawal, and the peace movement embraced this logic. Athens 
was plastered with slogans which declared that at last an end of the dependence  the struggle 
is being vindicated. Exsormisi, the partys weekly magazine, trumpeted that the bases would close 
in 1988.74 Thousands of people wrote to the Prime Minister to congratulate him on a major 
foreign policy success that restored national pride.75 EEDYE and AKE did express concern and 
lamented the government for not removing the bases as promised immediately after its electoral 
victory. But their disappointment was not vocal, and it did not translate into further protests 
against the government. This was largely due to respective party instructions, as they did not 
want to fracture left-wing unity and were focusing on a strong drive against the right.76 
Moreover, the tone of dissent that accompanied the USGreece negotiations seemed to satisfy 
protesters in its own right. Even in the absence of concrete results and the continuation of 
American bases on Greek soil, Trigazis admitted that we were not disappointed, as at least our 
voices were heard for the first time.77 Instead, they were more interested in voicing their 
grievances and developing a narrative of defiance. Another former activist stated in an interview 
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that: for the first time, we felt Greece was an equal partner in global affairs. Despite the results, 
we felt really good protesting for peace, motivated by indignation and the need to have more 
control and have a say in our own life, for a better life.78 
 
IV. 
Nationalism was a key source of motivation for the Greek peace protests of the 1980s. 
As with other peace movements around the world, however, the protests also emphasised the 
horrors of nuclear destruction.79 Following Reagans decision to restart the production of the 
neutron bomb in 1981, scientific associations and trade unions demonstrated in front of the US 
Embassy in Athens with banners which read: The catastrophe that prefers humans over 
buildings. In November of that same year, a large demonstration took place against the neutron 
bomb. As organiser of the event, the famous composer Mikis Theodorakis declared: 
 
Only cannibals could produce a weapon that kills people and leaves intact the products 
of their work. And this is what the American government is doing now. Its zero hour, 
with a danger of a nuclear holocaust at our door. There is no time for illusions. Each 
sane person needs to stand up.80  
 
In an interview, the president of the KEADEA, Markopoulos, expressed similar concern 
for the urgency of the situation: [W]hat is at stake here is the very belief in progress, in the 
ability and will to live with the possibility of annihilation.81 He was worried that the whole 
edifice of progress was in peril if nuclear weapons technology was applied in practice.  
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On 17 May 1982  celebrated as a day of peace, as well as the anniversary of Lambrakis 
death  all three peace movements (KEADEA, EEDYE and AKE) cooperated to hold a 
marathon walk with 30,000 participants and well-known athletes from around the world in 
Pedion Areos. The main slogan was yes to life, no to the arms of death. There were three floats, 
one with SS-20s and Pershing II missiles, another with Brezhnev and Reagan holding the globe 
on their fingertips and a third with depictions of pollution and environmental destruction. 
Activists, appalled by the cost of the military build-up which had skyrocketed to a global 
expenditure of $500 billion in 1980, were demanding this money to be spent on health care, food 
and education instead.82 Out of the military wing of NATO, so Greece does not become 
Hiroshima, noted one activist statement. My name is Eirini [Peace] and I want to live 
peacefully, wrote a 50-year-old woman. A resistance fighter told reporters: I am joining the rally 
as I dont want my children and grandchildren to go through what I had to: two wars. I know 
very well the value of peace.83 
The Greek peace movement employed similar collective action and pressure group 
tactics to Western Europe. The message of peace may have been deeply nationalistic in its 
framing, but the mode of protest was truly transnational. As well as capitalising on the 
importance of locality in projecting peace demands, Greek advocates for peace took advantage 
of different protest methods that had proved effective in other European countries. These 
transnational entanglements were a result of multiple factors, including platforms such as the 
END, international conferences that allowed for the exchange of ideas as well as festival of 
communist parties, with the World Youth Festival surfacing as an important transmission belt of 
ideas.84 It was also the simple fact that Greek protesters were equally concerned with how to 
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keep up momentum and involve various social actors in their mobilisation. In an information 
bulletin, EEDYE warned:  
 
We must keep public opinion informed more systematically, to convince the population 
that there is an immediate danger of war, so that the different social strata in their daily 
life can understand and better link the demands of peace and national independence with 
the peoples problems, and with the cultural and peace traditions of our country.85  
 
In their publications, they used strong images to drive home the urgency of collective 
action, rally media attention and provoke an emotional reaction. One of the most prominent 
photos was that of an activist marching alone towards the American base in Nea Makri, proudly 
carrying the Greek flag.86 It was perfect in showcasing how the small and proud Greek nation 
was standing up to the big bully. The circulation of journals and information bulletins  along 
with the organisation of rallies, demonstrations and human chains  was meant to encourage 
local actors to become pacesetters of the peace movement. The movement for nuclear-free cities 
found some of its roots in Greece, making it another contribution of local government to the 
cause for peace. As in other countries, peace protesters addressed issues of defence at the local 
level, debating elite decisions on the nuclear arms race and the procurement of armaments, 
which for the most part were both inaccessible to public review. Greek municipalities and parks 
were declared nuclear-free in an effort to localise peacebuilding efforts. Despite contempt for the 
efficacy of such actions, this decision made decentralisation a key element of political action.87 
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One of the most famous images of the peace movement was taken in the largest 
demonstration of this protest cycle. Taken in November 1983, it shows a boy carrying a sign that 
read I want to live  I wonder, tomorrow, will the children of the world be able to wake up?. 
Behind the sign, a detonating Pershing II is pictured.88 The centrality of children and their 
innocence was evident in murals designed to honour peace. For example, a famous mural in 
Zografou depicted the protest of young students. By showing a close-up of their faces, everyone 
could discern their agony in juxtaposition to an old lady sitting on a porch surrounded by 
pigeons, symbolising a free and peaceful life.89  
Unlike the protests of the 1970s, which had students as their main constituency, the 
mobilisation of the 1980s cut across generational lines and was more heterogeneous in terms of 
age, education, class and gender. All three peace movements of the 1980s, like their European 
counterparts, situated the individual and her needs at the centre of politics of peace. Across the 
board, activists promoted disarmament and feminism as linked issues. The image of the female 
activist was reproduced innumerable times in publications and campaign material. Furthermore, 
in Greek peace discourse, the social and political role of the mother was central in opposing war. 
Holding a banner, she is portrayed as an integral contributor to the peace process. In the spirit of 
Balkan cooperation, the Federation of Greek Women (OGE) organised a demonstration on the 
GreekBulgarian border with the slogan Balkans Without Nuclear. In the neutral zone of the 
border outposts, there was a meeting of 80 OGE members with the corresponding Bulgarian 
womens movement. This peace rally took place to celebrate Womens Day. We believe that the 
womens federation in both our countries should and have to contribute positively to the 
safeguarding of peace, given the positive attitude of both of our governments on the 
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denuclearisation of the Balkans and the stabilisation of peace.90 It was mainly the two organised 
feminist movements , OGE and Union of Women of Greece (EGE) that made inroads in peace 
mobilisation largely because of their links with the KKE and PASOK respectively.91 
Spatial politics  attempts to connect political messages to specific spaces  were widely 
practiced in Greek protest, as with the rest of the European mobilisation. Significant peace 
initiatives were linked to local problems and traditions to maximise public attention and to 
resonate emotionally with local audiences. The geographic structuring of collective action 
formed an integral part of Greeces contentious politics.92 In Crete, peace was linked with the 
struggles against the foreign bases and the celebration of the Battle of Crete of 20 May 1941, a 
major reference point for the national resistance during the Second World War. In the port of 
Piraeus, peace was linked with the struggle against the visits of the Sixth Fleet. On the island of 
Rhodes, mobilisation was directed against the Voice of America substation that was posted 
there.93  
In 1984, Athens cast itself as a city of peace. From the Acropolis, an ancient symbol of 
world civilisation, Greece initiated a minute of silence for peace, which had been unanimously 
accepted by UNESCO. In the presence of the Minister of Culture, renowned actress Melina 
Mercouri, a plaque was engraved with the phrase Athens  Peace  Culture and positioned 
under an olive tree, a symbol for unity. In her statement to the press, and full of emotion, she 
proclaimed that it was the first day of spring, and it is a huge day, the beginning of  peace  
We are experiencing an amazing moment here under the Acropolis, this monument of 
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freedom.94 Athens was officially declared a city of peace and EastWest dialogue on 6 August 
1984, the 39th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing. Thousands of people held candles and 
formed a protective human chain that lit up the monument, and slogans such as Save the 
Acropolis, life and civilisation from nuclear destruction featured. The Dean of the University of 
Athens, Michalis Stamatopoulos, exclaimed:  
 
We are all here to declare our faith in our monuments and the values of our civilisation, 
the faith to the human being itself, and declare our strong will to avoid at any cost 
another Hiroshima  Today, we are spending 2 billion dollars a day on nuclear 
armaments while 40 million people die from starvation every year.95 
 
The choice to hold this event at the Acropolis gave the peace movement a clear visual 
identity and helped the diverse committees mobilise alongside one another. Furthermore, the 
event symbolised the need to fight to preserve ancient monuments from the possibility of a 
nuclear holocaust. The Acropolis, alongside other ancient sites in Athens, became the backdrop 
to the peace rituals, embedding the activists in a joint social framework.  
The peace committees opted for such cultural spaces, loaded with political meaning, to 
mitigate their scant budgets and problems of visibility.96 Several rallies were organised along the 
symbolic road from Marathon  a place of voluntary sacrifice, freedom of speech and the 
defence of democratic principles  to the Field of Ares, linked to the eponymous god of war and 
renamed by activists as the Field of Peace. As the leader of AKE, Argyropoulos noted the 
Greek peace activists showed with actions the idea that history is not written on the battlefield 
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but in the conscience of the people. Argyropoulos tapped into Lambrakis legacy, who had 
become the icon of peace mobilisation in Greece, by stating that: 
  
 we are walking in [his] footsteps  on the side of the non-aligned peace movements, 
against bipolarism, hegemonism and the weapons of death. 21 years ago, today, the 
frontrunner of peace, Lambrakis was fighting for his life, heavily wounded, wounded by 
the parastate, which detested the vision of people for a better life. And it was this blood 
that watered the tree of Peace and Democracy in our tortured country.  
 
Piraeus also turned into a port of peace for three days in July 1983.97 The most popular 
and important rallies took place on the anniversary of the student uprising of 1973, with a 
customary march towards the US Embassy. John Karamichas has offered what he calls a 
memetic explanation of the power and lure of specific sites in inciting protest, noting a self-
reproducing, culturally legitimised pattern of youth rebellion in Greece that goes back to the 
student struggle against the military junta.98 The peace mobilisation was, therefore, effectively 
appropriating public urban spaces to spread its message.  
On an organisational level, the Greek peace movement had varied and intensive 
transnational links with other peace organisations across Europe. All three Greek peace 
movements took part in the Pan-European meeting of independent peace movements on the 
issue of disarmament in Brussels. This took place between 2 and 4 June 1983, with 1,500 
representatives from 19 countries. On numerous occasions, Greece acted as a host to 
transnational peace initiatives. In October 1983, the International Peace Forum was organised in 
Rhodes and was attended by 80 foreign delegates with a series of plays, exhibitions of Greek art, 
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traditional and popular concerts and a shadow theatre. A lively concert by the popular 
composer Dionysis Savvopoulos and readings by the famous poet Giannis Ritsos captivated 
thousands of people in the audience. An END report highlighted the benefits of celebrating 
cultural creativity, noting that the two-and-a-half day event was an imaginative way to talk about 
peace that did much to counteract the rather arid official proceedings.99 
The first international conference for the denuclearisation of Europe was indicative of 
this spirit of cooperation. It was organised by KEADEA in Athens in December 1982, in 
coordination with the International Peace Communication and Coordination Centre (IPCC), a 
Dutch peace movement. It attracted a great number of peace movements as well as well-known 
personalities from across the globe, all of whom contributed collectively to the spirit of 
Athens.100  In the same spirit two years later, in December 1984, KEADEA organised a second 
conference for establishing the EastWest dialogue. It comprised of representatives from 64 
peace movements and 30 countries, as well as the US and USSR. It was the first time that 
representatives from both Eastern and Western European peace movements discussed the 
challenges for peace and denuclearisation. In his opening statement, Markopoulos said that with 
this conference, KEADEA becomes the connecting link between the peace movements of East 
and West.101 The conferences primary objective was to come up with practical steps to freeze 
nuclear proliferation and to restore the dialogue between East and West. 
These conferences saw the rise of Andreas Papandreou as the leader and star of the 
peace movement, as well as the launch of the Six Nation Initiative.102 His participation was 
heralded by the press as a legitimisation of the peace movement, and other activists believed that 
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it brought the peace movement out of obscurity.103 In his address to attendees, Papandreou 
proudly noted that Greece was the only Western European country that embraced the peace 
movements and ceased to consider them in opposition.104 While the delegations were 
enthusiastic about his speech, the leader of the opposition in Greece, Evangelos Averoff, did not 
share the enthusiasm. Commenting on Papandreous performance, the leader of ND noted that:  
 
[Papandreou] continues be the only European leader to support the Soviet proposal of 
denuclearised zones. Everyone knows that the need for armaments is a result of the 
Soviet actions. Even the socialist governments accept that  The Prime Minister should 
stop playing this game of impressions while in reality damaging the international prestige 
of the countrys reputation.105 
 
 However, for KEADEA and the other Greek peace movements, the example set by 
Papandreou would be pivotal in convincing more Western politicians to embrace their cause. In 
END and CND documents, Greece is applauded for successfully establishing a strong link 
between the civilians who struggled for peace and the government.106 
By 1986, the wave of transnational anti-nuclear weapons protest had peaked in terms of 
its scale, the diversity of groups participating and the volume of disruptive activity.107 Greeces 
peace mobilisation, partly a local expression of a global phenomenon of protest against 
Euromissiles, had followed this transnational trend. Its strength had, however, diminished a little 
earlier. Indeed, there was a dramatic decline in the amount of anti-nuclear and anti-American 
protests after the signing of a USGreek defence agreement that provided for the continuation 
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of US bases on Greek soil.108 Moreover, PASOKs second victory in the elections of 1985 and 
the continuing links with both the EEC and NATO weakened the polarised and nationalistic 
climate of the early 1980s  on foreign policy issues and deprived the peace movements of new 
interpretive frames.  
 
 
 
V. 
As in Western Europe, the Greek mobilisation for peace in the 1980s surged as a result 
of the Euromissile crisis. Greeks became part of a transnational movement and tapped into 
similar organisational resources to express dissent, emulating wider continental protest tactics. 
While the Pan-European framework is relevant, a better understanding of the popularity of the 
peace movement and its dynamics lies in analysing such acts of protest in their specific cultural 
and national circumstances. Although it grew out of international developments, the Greek 
peace movement was primarily embedded in a culture of protest and polarisation that related to 
the national political scene of the period. PASOKs rise to power played a key role in the 
institutionalisation of protest, at the same time leading public contestation side-by-side with 
movements on the street. In Greece, the centrality of the socialist party and other left-wing 
parties in social mobilisation defined both the nature of the protests and their development. The 
close association between the peace movements and the political left was a huge source of 
strength and legitimisation in a period of democratic consolidation. 
The fight for peace was framed as an appeal for national sovereignty. It was rooted in anti-
Americanism and a fight against imperialism, and struck a responsive chord amongst activists 
following the fall of the dictatorship and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The emphasis on 
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national pride and resisting foreign pressure figured frequently in the rhetoric of the peace 
movements. Most importantly, peace protesters reframed and reconfigured the Cold War 
narrative. They emphasised their own national needs, resorting to local vernaculars and spatial 
politics to bring their message home. In a time of heightened tensions between the superpowers, 
the success of the peace movement in Greece stemmed from its ability to distance itself from the 
Cold War paradigm, prioritising national interests in its place. 
